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Tomasz Kalaga
Plagiarism in the Contemporary Academia: 
Identity and Ethics
It would be difficult to consider the problem of plagiarism without entan­
gling oneself into the web of relations that it forms with the structure of the 
institution of academia. The complexity of those relations surfaces when it is 
realised that plagiarism, broadly perceived as a breach of honest scholarship, 
infringes simultaneously upon several established and approved social orders. 
The internal rules of the most conspicuous of those orders, the judicial, the 
economic and the ethical, cannot accept plagiarism within their boundaries, 
discerning it respectively as criminal, unprofitable and immoral. The analysis 
of the question of plagiarism performed from those angles would almost 
certainly prove to be fruitless, at the risk of being obvious. However, the study 
of the actual guidelines for the proper conduct of a student or a scholar, which 
are published by almost every university, may point towards a direction quite 
different from the axiomatic presuppositions as to the reason for the apparent 
vice of plagiarism.
In order to illuminate the essence of this dilemma, it is not enough to 
perceive plagiarism as a mere disturbance of the orders or codes to which the 
academic structure answers and by which it functions, for those orders or codes 
are largely universal in the western society and may apply in case of almost 
every social phenomenon. Plagiarism must be regarded as a parasite burrow­
ing into the very foundations of the academic construction. It is the task of the 
present paper to suggest certain dangers to the modern day academia and to 
demonstrate how the self-defence mechanism of the academia reacts to those 
dangers by issuing discursive practises which are directed at what may be 
considered as the identity of a scholar and which construct this identity upon 
moral and ethical basis.
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The word “advancement” connotes the term “progress,” a notion which from 
the post-modern perspective is simply unacceptable. As Ihab Hassan writes, 
the post-modern period is characteristic of decanonisation which “applies to 
all canons, all conventions of authority. We are witnessing [...] a massive 
‘delegitimation’ of the mastercodes in society, a desuetude of the metanarra­
tives, favouring instead ‘les petites histoires’ [...]. Thus from the ‘death of god’ 
to the ‘death of the author’ and ‘death of the father’, from the derision of au­
thority to revision of the curriculum, we decanonise culture, demystify knowl­
edge, deconstruct the languages of power, desire, deceit.”1 This “incredulity 
towards metanarratives” applies to the narrative of Progress, the leading no­
tion of the Enlightenment period. Reason, the ultimate instrument in the search 
for Truth, ensured the reciprocating progress of the human sciences. We recall 
the unshakeable belief in the human faculties in the words of Marquis de 
Condorcet, one of the leaders of the movement:
We have already seen reason lift her chains, shake herself free from some of 
them, and, all the time regaining strength, prepare for and advance the mo­
ment of her liberation. It remains for us to study the stage in which she fi­
nally succeeds in breaking these chains, and when, still compelled to drag 
their vestiges behind her, she frees herself from them, one by one; when at 
last she can go forward unhindered, and the only obstacles in her path are 
those that are inevitably renewed at every fresh advance because they are 
the necessary consequences of the very constitution of our understanding - 
of the connection, that is, between our means of discovering the truth and 
the resistance that it offers to our efforts.* 2
The current period of revision progresses (!) by the movements of reflec­
tion, duplication, reiteration. The structuralist bricolage does not produce - it 
only restructures. The poststucturalist critique affixes the “s” to the word 
“criticism” inviting potential analysis from many different perspectives. His­
tory is rewritten, literary works undergo the same process. In this light, the word 
“knowledge” becomes highly suspect and probably a concept easy to under­
mine. The current methodological trends, such as the critical pedagogy, for 
example, reflect the aforementioned attitude and are characterised by the belief 
in the relativism of knowledge and truth.
The Enlightenment notion of reason needs to be reformulated within a critical 
pedagogy. First, educators need to be sceptical regarding any notion of rea-
Ihab Hassan, “Pluralism in Postmodern Perspective,” in Postmodernism: A Reader, ed. 
T. Docherty (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), p. 196.
‘ Marquis de Condorcet, “Sketch for an Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human 
Mind,” in From Modernism to Postmodernism: an Anthology, ed. L Cahoone (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1996), p. 73.
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son that purports to reveal the truth by denying its own historical and ideo­
logical principles [...] This suggests that we reject claims to objectivity in 
favour of partial epistemologies that recognise the historical and socially con­
structed nature of their own knowledge claims and methodologies?
The difficulty with the critique of meta-narratives lies in the persistent 
question whether such a critique is not a meta-narrative itself. The belief in the 
socially constructed knowledge is most certainly also a socially constructed 
belief, a fact which many post-modern critics conveniently chose to ignore. 
Regardless of this problem which calls for a separate discussion of its own, 
knowledge, nowadays, is sought in a relentless movement backwards; a re­
examination rather than creation. The modern humanities move within the 
sphere of re-drafting. The words “creation” or “invention” are substituted with 
a term from a vocabulary of industry - “production.” The production of mean­
ing, the production of texts, the production of interpretation; an assembly line 
jargon heralds the era of re-production, the reality of simulacra and the copy 
without the original.
Stripped of the safe ideal of progress and reason, the humanities become 
much more susceptible to the dangers of self re-production. In a world-philos­
ophy of the Enlightenment, plagiarism would be an offence against the very 
principles of the movement, yet paradoxically it would seem a far lesser dan­
ger than today. Two main reasons account for this fact. Firstly, the search for 
truth through the faculty of reason is a dynamic movement forward', plagia­
rised work as an encumbering repetition presents in such situation only a minor 
hindrance in the context of the drive of the epoch, which is strong enough to 
overcome momentary procrastination. Secondly, plagiarism and progress form 
a distinct dichotomy, a polarity where the first term is an obvious negation of 
the other. Within this opposition, the right and the wrong are implicitly defined 
and, in a certain sense, stand as axiomatic conclusions of this particular ide­
ology. In such a predicament, plagiarising is not so much an offence against 
the community or an institution but a crime against the very ethos of the epoch. 
Ethical branding becomes therefore far easier and does not call for a specific 
set of rules or guidelines.
The so-called post-modern times are to a far greater extent open to the 
danger of plagiarism. The mood of relativism, represented to the extreme in 
the faction of the postmodernist “anything goes,” eventuates in any firm ethos 
being, if not far weaker, than at least much more difficult to locate or ascer­
tain. In the situation where diffusion, dispersion and finally decapitalization of 
truth and knowledge replace the forward movement under the banner of
3 Henry A. Giroux, “Towards a Postmodern Pedagogy,” in From Modernism to 
Postmodernism: an Anthology, ed. L Cahoone (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1996), 
p. 693.
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progress, there lurks the shadow of angst at the pitfail of self-duplication. The 
humanities become the area of compilation where creativity constitutes, as 
Michel de Carteau ironically points out “the act of reusing and recombining 
heterogeneous materials. Meaning is tied to the significance that comes from 
this new use. [...] Central here is the cultural act that is part and parcel of the 
“colage,” the invention of forms and combinations, and the procedures that 
allow such composite shapes to be multiplied. A technical act par excellence.”4 
The obsession of the academia with the referenced functions as a safe-guard 
against the possibility of stagnation. While it became unfashionable to speak 
of progress or advancement, there still remains the necessity of meaningful 
expansion in order for the academia to function. Without the concrete and 
focused Project and left instead with the prefix “re-,” contemporary scholar­
ship is vulnerable to the virus of repetition or “the same.” It becomes thus vitally 
important to protect the “soundness” of research via strict university policies 
on plagiarism.
The problem is amplified through the fact that the academic structure does 
not undergo any radical metamorphosis. Even though the notions behind the 
current subjects of scholarship may be radically post-modern, the structure 
within which they are practised does not appear to correspond to the content. 
Apart from the phenomenon of “political correctness” and the modified atti­
tude towards the so-called minorities, the system remains a system which must 
function, grow and, to use once again the industrial terminology, produce. 
Essays, thesis and articles must be created and originality is one of the prime 
requirement for their approval in the scholars’ community. Thus we are faced 
with a confrontation of silencing of philosophies based upon the notion of 
progress with the essential demand for originality and uniqueness.
In such light, the act of plagiarising in its strictest, literal sense stalls and 
inhibits the process of expansion. In the Baudrillardian era of hyperreality and 
above all of dis-chronic re-production and repetition, the academic work par­
adoxically stands as a bastion of the concept of the individual. Working within 
the definition of individual as something unique and original, one may easily 
envisage the academic work as a manifestation of the concept which has the 
notion of singularity written into its very core. The collaboration of the two 
factors, the academic work and the expansion, may perhaps be easiest to find 
in the case of the experimental sciences, particularly the areas of physics and 
chemistry. Yet evoking such an instance may cause a shadow mistrust to loom 
from the direction of the contemporary humanities over the physical sciences 
burdened by the prodigal affliction of the Enlightenment. Plagiarism heralds 
the death of knowledge, and constitutes an act where movement of revision 
4 Michel de Certeau, Culture in the Plural (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1997), p. 49.
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turns inwards, a gesture of procrastination for the sake of unproductive rep­
etition. For even at the heart of Baudrillardian exhilaration with hyperreal 
absence of originals, the submergence into the world of the copy, lies the 
nagging notion of multiplicity which through its mere presence turns one’s 
attention to the previously mentioned, subtle yet significant, difference be­
tween the concepts “production” and “creation.” And it would appear proper 
to advocate that academic works are created rather than produced, as “cre­
ation” contains within it an innate notion of originality, an essential ingre­
dient of every academic work but not necessarily a notion implied by the word 
“production.”
Plagiarism poses a threat precisely towards creation, an event responsible 
for the expansion of the academic universe. Even though “creation” and “pro­
duction” may be used interchangeably and may perhaps in some context be 
treated as synonymous nouns which describe the process of something com­
ing into existence, “production” points towards socio-economic connotation 
while “creation” contains within it the trace of the metaphysical. “Production” 
may mean the making of a copy, while “creation” conceives the original. And 
it is the event of creation that must move to the foreground in the academic 
world of compilation and referencing.
Michel Foucault thus characterises the modern scholar:
It seems to me that what must now be taken into account in the intellectual 
is not the “bearer of universal values.” Rather, it’s the person occupying 
a specific position - but whose specificity is linked, in a society like ours, to 
the general functioning of the apparatus of truth. In other words, the intel­
lectual has a three-fold specificity: that of his class position [...]; that of his 
condition of life and work, linked to his condition as an intellectual (his field 
of research, his place in the laboratory, the political and economic demands 
to which he submits or against which he rebels, in the university, the hospi­
tal, etc.); lastly the specificity of the politics of truth in our societies.5
Of particular interest in context of this article are the latter two character­
istics, especially if examined in the light of Foucault’s following remarks from 
the same text:
“Truth” is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the pro­
duction, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements.
“Truth” is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce 
and sustain it, and to the effects of power which it induces and which ex­
tend it. A regime of truth.6
5 Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power,” in From Modernism to Postmodernism: an 
Anthology, ed. L Cahoone (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1996), p. 380.
6 Ibid., p. 380.
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The scholar is deeply submerged into the network of power relations with his 
home institution, a situation which implies a great degree of potential influence 
of such institution over an academic. Foucault’s remarks on truth being 
a subjective product of a system of power may lead to the conclusion that certain 
“axiomatic” laws of scholarly conduct are but a discursive construct of the order 
of academia. This inference combined with the previous remarks about the acute 
necessity of preserving originality suggest an employment of tools designed 
to forge the identity of a scholar according to the blueprint intended for the 
purpose of sustaining the advancement, or more preferably, the extension of 
the academic knowledge. The remaining part of this paper will highlight that 
through plagiarism policies, the universities implicitly construct the expansion 
of knowledge as dogmatically ethically grounded, and that those ethical tenets 
are implicitly written into the foundations of one’s identity as a scholar and 
insubordination towards them ultimately leads to erasure or dissolution of that 
identity. As Nietzsche would say: “You shall obey - someone and for a long 
time: else you will perish and lose the last respect for yourself.”7
An extensive study of university guidebooks available on the internet re­
sults in the possibility of distinguishing three separate groups of reasons for 
the necessity of avoidance of plagiarism, each one appealing to a different facet 
of scholarly experience. The examples presented below are the most represent­
ative of those groups, where the phrasing of the arguments leaves no doubt 
as to the intentions of their creator.
The first group may be seen as presenting plagiarism as an offence against 
the “self.” It would appear that the manipulative discourse is directed at one’s 
personal interests and it plays its persuasive role through the appeal towards 
one’s aims, ambitions and values. The arguments presuppose a certain already 
existing set of prerogatives, built into one’s code of behaviour as an innate part 
of the psyche. The following citations exemplify this reasoning.
If you plagiarise, your are cheating yourself. You don’t learn to write out 
your thoughts in your own words, and you don’t get specific feedback geared 
to your individual needs and skills. Plagiarising a paper is like sending a friend 
to practise tennis for you - you’ll never score an ace yourself.8
Each of us must learn how to declare intellectual debts. Proper attribution 
acknowledges those debts responsibly, usefully and respectfully. Attribution 
is responsible when it comes at a location and in a fashion that leaves read­
ers in no doubt about whom you are thanking for what.9
7 Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Natural History of Morals,” in From Modernism to 
Postmodernism: an Anthology, ed. L Cahoone (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1996), 
p. 107.
8 http://sja.ucdavis.edu/SJA/plagiarism.html
9 http://www.nwu.edu/uacc/p 1 agiar.htm 1
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[...] an attribution is respectful when it expresses our appreciation for some­
thing done well enough to warrant our borrowing it. We should take pride in 
the intellectual company we keep. It speaks well of us that we have chosen 
to use the work of intelligent, interesting people, and we can take genuine 
pleasure in joining our name with theirs.10 11
The first citation appeals to the individual’s desire for improvement. 
A student or an academic, through a thoughtless gesture of duplication, deprives 
himself of the possibility of inner development which, as the passage seems 
to imply, can only be achieved through original production and intellectual 
effort.
The second quote appeals to the individual’s innate sense of justice, by the 
means of conjuring socially favoured, predominant and acknowledged values 
of responsibility, honour and respect. A good scholar ought to be a person of 
high moral and ethical standards for whom the obedience to such code of 
conduct is far more important than the temptation of the perspectives of ill- 
gotten, unfair advantage.
The third quote appeals to one’s individual sense of pride and achievement. 
The extract lends itself towards the interpretation in which a doubtful benefit 
of successful deception is far outdone by the satisfaction of including VIP’s 
of the academic world in your work, thus enlarging your ego by seeing your 
own name amongst the famous.
The second group of reasons for avoiding plagiarism relates to the realm 
of community and suggests that other scholars receive the blunt of your wrong­
doings. Here, the act of plagiarism threatens the social structure of the academia 
and is portrayed to disturb the rules upon which this construction rests and by 
which it is propelled to function.
Plagiarism devalues other’s original work. Submitting a professional writer’s 
work is taking an unfair advantage over students who do their own work.11
Plagiarism is dishonest because it is an attempt to claim an undeserved credit 
which rightly belongs to another author. Plagiarism is an intellectual equiva­
lent of stealing and will absolutely not be tolerated.12
Here, we find the most widely encountered response to plagiarism - an appeal 
for an ethical academic stance towards others. In the first instance, other stu­
dent’s or scholar’s work pales in comparison with the seemingly effortless, and 
voluminous writings of high quality “produced” by the cheating party. The 





feeding upon other’s effort in order to further one’s own reputation and aca­
demic position. Both of those examples upset the processes of fair academic 
competition and disturb the structure of the mutual exchange of knowledge 
essential to the advancement of scholarship.
The third group entails reasons which connect directly to the institution­
alised form of academia, namely the university structure.
universities reputation affects the value of your degree; [...] dishonesty hurts 
(its) standing.13
Universities have several functions, including training for various vocations. 
But at all times they are expected to teach in a way which helps and requires 
students to acquire the skills of intellectual inquiry. To this end, universities 
are expected to assess their students to see whether this expectation had been 
met. By the awarding of a degree the university is guaranteeing to the pub­
lic, amongst other things, that the graduate has made the grade in this re­
spect. Where students attempt to deceive their assessor as to the level of 
achievement they have actually reached, this is not only immoral but puts 
the universities reputation at risk.14
Those two citations exemplify the final ethical argument, namely the sin of 
disloyalty towards the institution which raised the individual as alma mater and 
towards whom one ought to feel greatly indebted. The act of plagiarism is 
a gesture aimed against the parent-institution, by all means a most unethical deed.
Thus the policies on plagiarism present certain rigid models and obedi­
ence of those standards is deemed necessary for the modern academic. Proper 
scholarship entails therefore three distinct groups of qualities and expectations 
of behaviour: Firstly, high personal standards, such as constant strive for 
improvement, the sense of responsibility and honour and intellectual pride. 
Secondly, a responsibility to maintain and support the social structure of the 
academia, which includes the proper ethical approach of compliance with the 
rules of fair competition and moral obligation towards other academics. Third­
ly, the expectation of loyalty towards the institutionalised form of academia 
that is the home university.
Those three aspects of the practice of scholarship are more than just rules 
of conduct; instead they actually constitute the basis, the foundation upon which 
each individual scholar’s identity is raised. These ethical bounds, establish 
a universal identity-pattern, an archetypal form which functions upon three 
plateaux, as exemplified by the three categories described a moment ago - the 
13 http://sja.ucdavis.edu/SJA/plagiarism.html
14 Study Guide: Structure Thought and Reality (Perth: Murdoch University Press, 1994), 
p. 74.
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level of the “self,” the level of the “community” and the level of the “insti­
tution.” Those three aspects are exhaustive of the possible modes of function­
ing as an academic or even, it may be valid to say, as a human being. Any in­
dividual scholar personality/identity will be a mixture resulting from the inci­
dents and actions occurring within those three overlapping realms. The academic 
guidebooks concerning plagiarism precisely set the acceptable moral standards 
of behaviour for each of those realms and as such transport those realms into 
the dimension of ethics. The identity of a scholar will thus have ethical sub­
structure and its possible unsettling may cause the individual identity to col­
lapse or be taken away. It is essential to stress once again, that any potential 
coming to being of an individual identity is heavily embedded into the moral 
plane and bound to function within the mechanism of constructed values for 
the zones of the “self,” the “community” the “institution.”
It must be noticed, therefore, that while any of the aspects of the conduct 
of a scholar may be broken, such an occurrence does not necessarily end one’s 
career. Plagiarism, on the other hand, definitely and permanently discredits him/ 
her, thus effectively removing their identity from them. For example, if an 
academic produces no work of value, or no work at all, he/she is simply a bad 
scholar. If he/she is arrogant and unpleasant towards colleagues or disloyal 
towards their department or university, he/she simply earns a bad reputation. 
In all of those cases a scholar is still able to function with more or less hin­
drance and is still identified with the role/image/position of an academic. 
Plagiarism, however, ruins in practice the whole career, bestowing brands which 
are impossible to get rid off.
The conclusions may be formulated as follows: through the ethical implica­
tions of the postulated justifications of the wrongs of plagiarism, the academia 
builds and enforces a basic identity structure of a scholar and the premises 
contained within that skeleton, working on the principle of opposition, promote 
the advancement of knowledge by arguments no other than those of strong ethical 
and moral reason. The statement may be illuminated from yet another angle, 
namely the examination of the individual identity coming into being. As it was 
stated previously, this process occurs according to the foundation composed of 
the ethical principles which govern the main plateaux. Those principles were seen 
as being derived from the arguments against plagiarism and plagiarism is their 
chief, simultaneous undoing. Now, the opposite, or should one say, the only 
alternative to plagiarism is original work. If plagiarism unmistakably works against 
the three aspects of the “self’ “the community,” and “the institution” then cre­
ation of an original work, obeying the principle of opposition, is the proper mode 
of functioning and as such harvests merits on each respective level.
Being original means creating something new, thus sustaining the expan­
sion of knowledge. Mere stagnation, the lack of production is still potential 
originality while the true enemy of uniqueness is repetition and this is precise­
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ly the nature of plagiarism. One may equate here the term “repetition” with 
the breakage of the three identity corner-stones and at the same time equate 
it with the prevention of the growth or expansion of the academia. The scholar 
then moves within the sphere outlined by the oppositions originality/repetition 
and forced by the ethical arguments present within the dichotomy is always 
destined towards paying homage to the first of the two terms. In any other case, 
he/she is threatened by no less than a perspective of further inability of iden­
tification with the concept of the scholar. What results is a ceaseless develop­
ment of the academia, implicitly justified and at the same time caused by the 
ethical measures constructed by the university policies.
The discursive practise found underlying the relationship of scholarly 
conduct and plagiarism may thus be summarised to entail the following 
mechanisms. Most importantly, university conduct rules construct the founda­
tion of potential identity of a scholar to be raised upon proper moral attitude 
towards “the self,’’the “community,” the “institution.” In this context, plagia­
rism is the way of ultimate shattering of all of the three corner-stones and it 
results in a disqualification of a scholar and as such a denial of further claim 
to that particular identity. The identity itself can only be built and maintained 
through originality and creativity which benefits the academia with the circu­
lation and expansion of knowledge. The defence against the stagnation of this 
progress is ultimately based upon arguments of strongly ethical nature, which 
are, at the same time, construed to be an integral part of the scholar’s identity.
The ideology of plurality ultimately shifts the responsibility of maintaining 
the academic integrity to the individual scholar. Lacking a sharply defined ethos 
of progress, the modem academia is forced to revert to discursive practises, which 
direct the construction of scholar’s identity in such manner that originality is an 
essential prerequisite of any academic work. The ironic element of this phenom­
enon surfaces in the fact that the pragmatic arguments employed by the univer­
sities invoke ethical values which current curriculum of many departments may 
call into question. The relativism of the modem humanities, stripped of the firm 
doctrines of Reason, Truth and Progress, and above all threatened by the pre­
viously discussed dangers, moves the “universal” ethical principles from the realm 
of philosophical dogma or mood of the epoch to the realm of university admin­
istration. The advancement of the academia is thus no longer officially motivat­
ed and protected by the discarded ideals of the Enlightenment but promoted by 
the network of judicial, economic and most-importantly, ethical constructs woven 
into the social and communal fabric of a scholar’s identity.
